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Abstract
We examine the gap between perceptions of seeing referendums as an important democratic principle, versus perceiv-
ing how referendums are used in practice. We term this the “referendum disappointment” gap. We find support for ref-
erendums as a democratic principle is strongest among those most disaffected from the political system, and that the
disaffected are more likely to perceive they are not given a say via referendums. We also find context-specific effects. Dis-
appointment was greater in countries with higher corruption and income inequality. We also find higher disappointment
among right-populist voters, those who distrusted politicians, and among people who viewed themselves at the bottom
of society. Overall, these patterns reflect disappointment with democracy among sections of society who have a sense of
not being heard that conflicts with how they expect democracy should work in principle.
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1. Introduction
Given tensions between the need for representa-
tive democracy and the growing use of referendums
(Qvortrup, 2014), and tensions between representative
democracy and the use of referendums, it is impor-
tant that we better understand popular attitudes about
democracy as related to referendums. We use multi-
level models to estimate responses across 25 countries
to questions about referendums and democracy that
were included in the European Social Survey (ESS) in
2012–2013.We examine popular preferences for the use
of referendums. We pay particular attention to the gap
between how important people see referendum use in
principle, and how they see it actually practiced. We
test competing explanations of support for referendums.
One sees support for referendum democracy as a func-
tion of cognitive mobilization and a sign of engaged cit-
izens. A different argument locates support for referen-
dums in the views of disaffected people who are at the
periphery of the regular political process. We find more
support for the idea that it is this latter group, individuals
who are disaffected, who aremost supportive of referen-
dums as a democratic principle and who are more disap-
pointed with the practice of referendum democracy in
their country.
This article makes several contributions. Our cross-
national approach allows us to test for national context
as well as test individual-level hypotheses. We incorpo-
rate national level contextual factors such as income
inequality and political corruption alongside individual-
level attributes as we model support for referendum
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use and “referendum disappointment.” We thus raise
two points of wider relevance. First, for most people
in the countries we examine, majority rule (via referen-
dums) is a component of their conception of democracy
in principle. Second, the contrast between how refer-
endums are experienced in practice and how they are
expected in principle suggests many citizens are disap-
pointed with democracy in practice as it relates to using
referendums. Use of referendums falls short, sometimes
far short, of this popular expectation about democracy.
In other words, attitudes about referendum use provide
us with awindow intowider concerns people have about
their political system and the workings of democracy.
2. Popular Support for Referendums
The use of referendums varies substantially across the
globe (see LeDuc, 2003, for discussion on the range and
variety of direct democracy; Vatter & Bernauer, 2009).
Switzerland represents the extreme case: the popular
veto was adopted as early as 1831 and nearly 600 na-
tional referendums and citizen initiatives have appeared
on Swiss ballot since 1848 (Serdült, 2013). Denmark,
Italy, Ireland and Slovenia also provide examples of reg-
ular use of referendums (Qvortrup, 2014), and Iceland,
Great Britain, France, Spain, Slovakia, and Latvia all have
histories that include the occasional use of national ref-
erendums. Referendum use is rare in countries such as
the Czech Republic, Belgium, Finland, Norway and the
Netherlands, however recurring use of referendums in
neighboring countries on European integration (Hobolt,
2005) and other matters, and referendum use at the sub-
national level (Scarrow, 1999) likelymeans that even resi-
dents of placeswhere national referendums are not used
nonetheless have a sense of what referendums are.
Figure 1 illustrates responses to two ESS 6 questions,
one asking about how important it is to “democracy in
general” that people have a say through referendums,
and another that asks their perception of the extent to
which people in their country actually have a say through
referendums. Responses to the first item suggest that
people in numerous countries included in Round 6 of the
ESS (see Ferrin&Kriesi, 2016) placed substantial value on
referendums as being an important principle of democ-
racy. When asked to rate on a 0–10 scale how impor-
tant it was to “democracy in general…that citizens have
the final say on the most important political issues by
voting on them directly in referendums,” the modal re-
sponse was 10 in nearly every country where the ESS
was conducted (see Appendix for full question wording;
Figure 1. Attitudes about referendums being important for democracy (in principle), and perceptions of having a final say
in their country on important issues via referendums (in practice). Source: ESS Round 6 (2012).
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for a study using relatedWorld Values Survey items mea-
suring perceptions of how essential referendums are to
democracy, see Fuchs & Roller, 2018). The country-level
averages for attitudes about the importance of refer-
endums as a general principle of democracy are plot-
ted with the shaded bars in Figure 1. This level of sup-
port is also found elsewhere. Survey data from Canada
(Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001), Australia, New Zealand
(Donovan & Karp, 2006), and the United States (Cronin,
1989; Gilljam, Pesonen, & Listhaug, 1998) also show high
levels of popular support for using referendums.
Responses to the second item suggest much greater
variation in perceptions that referendums give people in
their country a say. People were asked to rate on a 0–10
scale, “to what extent do you think…citizens in [country]
have the final say by voting…directly in referendums.”
These responses are displayed in Figure 1 with the dark
bars. The use of referendums in practice varies quite
widely across these countries, and so to do perceptions
that people feel they have the final say via referendums.
Thus, while expectations of having the ‘final say’ by refer-
endum is high, and has little variance across these coun-
tries, it appears many people do not perceive they expe-
rience the referendum democracy they expect.
What do popular expectations about referendums
and democracy actually reflect, and who are those that
expect referendums but are disappointed? One set of ar-
guments (Donovan & Karp, 2006) sees support for refer-
endum use as consistent with the cognitive mobilization
thesis (Dalton, 1984; Inglehart, 1970). Dalton (1984) de-
fines cognitive mobilization as the spread of education,
access to mass media and low-cost information in ad-
vanced democracies, where people are increasing polit-
ically engaged. From this perspective, more people are
now capable of dealing “with the complexities of politics”
on their own (Dalton, 2007, p. 276). This process is some-
what similar to Norris’ concept of the “critical citizen”
(Norris, 1999). Signing petitions, boycotting, demonstrat-
ing, and protesting are forms of participation that Dalton
(2008) links to a politically engaged (rather than duty-
based) form of citizenship. Donovan and Karp (2006,
p. 679) have found some evidence from New Zealand,
Canada, and Switzerland consistent with the idea that
use of referendums is supported by those more politi-
cally engaged.
It follows that one might view citizens’ expectations
for referendums as a healthy sign of political engage-
ment, or even the reflection of people being interested
in participating more actively, and directly, in setting pol-
icy. We have less clear expectations about how the more
politically engaged or interested may perceive referen-
dum use in practice, as this may be contingent both on
how interested a person is in politics and how much ref-
erendums are actually used in a respondent’s country. If
engagement and interest drive expectations that referen-
dums are important, a person with a great interest in pol-
itics may evaluate practice more positively where refer-
endums are used more frequently. Conversely, if the po-
litically engaged expect referendums and perceive their
use is not sufficient, theymay bemore disappointedwith
referendum democracy.
An alternative view is that popular support for refer-
endums indicates disillusion with social conditions and
with established parties and representative democracy.
Findings fromDalton, Burklin and Drummond (2001) sug-
gest that support for direct democracy in Germany was
strongest among those who felt excluded from estab-
lishment politics and those at the ‘periphery’ of poli-
tics. Right-wing populist parties that exploit dissatisfac-
tion with status quo democracy (e.g., UKIP in Britain or
the FN in France) champion the use of referendums to
give people a greater voice, and to provide an end run
around establishment parties and politicians (Albertazzi
& McDonnell, 2015; Bowler, Denemark, Donovan, &
McDonnell, 2017; Mudde, 2004, 2007). Pauwels (2014,
p. 159) found that the call for referendum use moti-
vated somepeople to vote for populist parties in Belgium,
Germany and theNetherlands. Given this,we expect that
right-populist voters will be more supportive of giving
citizens a direct say via referendums. We might also ex-
pect that the expectation of having a say through refer-
endums could be more appealing to people who reside
in countries where institutions do a poor job processing
conflict and allocating resources. We thus expect poor
governance, poor economic performance, and tensions
associated with income inequality to affect expectations
for referendums and perceptions of their use.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) offer a view of sup-
port for direct democracy related to this latter argument
(also seeWebb, 2013). Support for referendums as an im-
portant democratic principle may thus reflect public dis-
dain for the perceived inappropriate influence that “spe-
cial” interests have over elected officials in a represen-
tative democracy. From this perspective, enthusiasm for
referendums may reflect a mistrust of incumbent par-
ties and establishment politics, rather than greater po-
litical engagement. Relatedly, perceptions that referen-
dums are not used in practice could reflect discontent
among the disaffected who expect another avenue of
voice than is available via representative processes they
may not trust.
Much existing literature considers support for refer-
endum use in general terms, without modeling how in-
terest in referendums relates to a person’s expectations
about how democracy should work or perceptions of
how it does work. Nonetheless, there are studies that
examine support for using referendums, mostly focus-
ing on individual countries. Bengtsson andMattila (2009)
found greater support for direct democracy in Finland
among people with less education, less information, and
among those who felt unrepresented. Schuck and De
Vreese (2011) found greater support for referendums
among the politically disaffected and those exposed to
tabloid-style news in the Netherlands, and emphasized
the role of cynicism in their subsequent work (Schuck &
De Vreese, 2015). Coffé and Michels (2014) also found
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lower educated Dutch respondents were more likely to
prefer direct and stealth democracy over representative
democracy. Dalton et al. (2001) concluded that the great-
est support for direct democracy in Germany can be
found among those “at the periphery of politics,” includ-
ing the less informed, those less interested, and support-
ers of extremist parties. Anderson and Goodyear-Grant
(2010) also found greater support for direct democracy
among less-informed Canadians, which they explained
as reflecting that “political sophisticates” have greater
confidence in government and are better able to iden-
tify the dangers that referendums may present. These
findings are consistent with the idea that those who are
more disillusioned, disaffected, and less politically en-
gaged may be more likely to view referendums as impor-
tant to democracy.
In contrast, Donovan and Karp (2006) found those
more interested in politics were more supportive of ref-
erendums in three of six countries studied, and those
participating in elections were more supportive in two
of those. Another study from the early 2000s across 16
countries (Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2007) found that in
nearly all countries, support for using referendums was
greatest among those who thought it was important for
people to havemore opportunities to participate, and, in
many countries, among those who were more politically
engaged. These results are consistent with the idea that
those more engaged are more likely to see referendums
as important to democracy.
The literature provides us these two contrasting ex-
pectations about how people assess the importance of
having referendums, each finding some support in pre-
vious research. We suggest we might find a deeper un-
derstanding about how people view referendums and
democracy by simultaneously considering their attitudes
about the importance of referendums to democracy, and
their perceptions about whether referendums are giving
people a say. We are interested in the importance that
people place on using referendums (again the shaded
bars in Figure 1), the extent to which they perceive that
referendums give people a say in their country (repre-
sented by the dark bars in Figure 1), and the difference
between these. This difference, we suggest, represents
how much a person who expects having a say via refer-
endums might be disappointed by perceiving those op-
portunities are limited in their country.
In the next section, we develop hypotheses that con-
sider country-level factors and individual-level factors
that may explain variation in: 1) attitudes about how
important people view referendums as part of democ-
racy; 2) perceptions of the extent that referendums give
people a say in their country; and 3) the difference be-
tween how important people view referendums as part
of democracy and their perceptions that referendums
give people in their country a say. In the analysis that
follows, we consider country-level factors and individual-
level factors that might affect attitudes about, and per-
ceptions of, referendum democracy.
3. Hypothesis and Model Specification
We expect attitudes about democracy and referendums,
and perceptions of having a say via referendums, are
shaped both by characteristics of individuals, and by the
social and political context of the country in which the
individual resides. We test hypotheses about: 1) factors
that structure attitudes about referendums as a gen-
eral principle of democracy; 2) factors structuring per-
ceptions of referendum use in practice; and 3) factors
that explain the gap (or disappointment) between re-
spondents’ expectations about referendums as a princi-
ple and their perceptions of referendum use in practice.
We thus estimate threemodels, one estimating attitudes
about referendums and democracy, one estimating per-
ceptions of referendum use, and one estimating the gap
between these first two measures.
3.1. Country-Level Hypotheses
Popular expectations about the role of referendums in
democracy, and perceptions of the use of referendums,
are not likely to occur in a vacuum. Rather, discon-
tent and disaffection with social and political conditions
might make referendums a seemingly appealing alterna-
tive to status quo representative democracy. We expect
people in countries with greater corruption, higher un-
employment, and greater income inequality to be more
disappointed with referendum democracy, while people
in countries using referendums more frequently are ex-
pected to be less disappointed. The former factors may
reflect a context of disaffection that drives expectations
for use of referendums, and disillusionment about po-
litical practices generally. Use of referendums, we ex-
pect, may mitigate some of this. There are few stud-
ies that examine country-level factors that might affect
attitudes about referendum use (for an exception see
Schuck & de Vreese, 2015, on support for referendums
on EU integration).
Our expectation here is that having a say through ref-
erendums could be more appealing to people who re-
side in countries where institutions do a poor job pro-
cessing conflict and allocating resources. One difficulty
in operationalizing this argument comes in selecting a
measure of governance. A key factor here is public cor-
ruption, which we see as the antithesis of good gover-
nance. It has been shown to erode political trust, and
it is associated with pessimism about the performance
of democracy in a country (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003).
We expect higher levels of (perceived) corruption to cor-
respond with greater expectations for referendums. Our
models are specifiedwith the Transparency International
measure of perceptions of public corruption.
Poor economic performance may breed similar dis-
content, creating additional demands for referendum
use. We expect higher unemployment to be associ-
ated weaker support for established institutions (Alesina,
Özler, Roubini, & Swagel, 1996; Robertson, 1983) and
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thus with heightened expectations for referendums. Eco-
nomic inequality, likewise, where a wealthy elite has dis-
proportionate influence over a country’s political institu-
tions, may also increase support for using referendums.
Solt (2008) provides evidence that greater income in-
equality produces greater political inequality, and Dotti
Sani andMagistro (2016) contend that inequality is linked
to political cynicism in Europe. Han and Chang (2016,
p. 94) argue that inequality can breed resentment to-
ward traditional democratic practices, undermine demo-
cratic attitudes, and decrease satisfaction with democ-
racy. Higher levels of economic inequality, then, could
lead to greater support for the use of referendums. Un-
employment is measured with World Bank data, and in-
equality is represented by a CIA gini index. We account
for party system disproportionality as a national-level
control, since this may also affect perceptions of demo-
cratic institutions (Anderson & Guillory, 1997).
Further, we expect that people in countries that used
referendums more frequently will be more familiar with
the process, and thus more likely to accept and expect
referendums as a regular feature of democracy. Like-
wise, we expect people in countries with greater refer-
endum use to be more likely to perceive that citizens
in their country have a say via referendums. Our mea-
sure of referendum use is a count of national-level ref-
erendums used in a country, calculated from Qvortrup
(2014). These nations differ in terms of institutional fea-
tures that affect how consequential various referendums
may be on policy (Hug, 2004; Leemann & Wasserfallen,
2016). Our measure does not account for this qualitative
aspect of referendum use. Rather, our count measure
acts as a proxy for experiences respondents’ might have
with referendums, rather than an indicator of policy con-
sequences of referendums.
3.2. Individual-Level Hypotheses
The engaged citizen thesis as related to referendum
democracy has us expect that those scoring higher on
participation, education, and interest are more likely to
expect referendums as an important part of democracy.
Their perceptions of referendum use, and thus poten-
tial for disappointment, may depend on how often ref-
erendums are used. Highly interested respondents may
find their expectations for referendum use met where
referendums are used more. This hypothesis flows from
the idea that the politically interested have a greater ex-
pectation of regularly influencing policy via referendums,
while having the capacity to do so. We expect those with
greater political interest to be more likely to expect hav-
ing a say via referendums, and to be disappointed if they
perceive they are not able to. The engaged citizen idea
also leads us to expect people with greater education,
and those who are generally engaged with participating
in politics, to be more likely to expect to decide mat-
ters via referendums. Interest is measured with a four
category self-reported item ranking interest in politics.
We use a battery of ESS questions to build a six-item
index of political participation (or engagement) that re-
flects working for a party, for an organization, display-
ing a badge or sticker, signing petitions, protesting, and
boycotting. Education is measured with a 7-category or-
dinal measure.
The rival disaffected citizen thesis as related to refer-
endum democracy has us expect that those who distrust
politicians, those who did not supported the main party
in government, and populist party supporters would be
more inclined to agree that referendumswere important.
Trust is measured on a 0–10 scale where 10 is most trust-
ing of politicians. Supporters of a governing party, and
populist party supporters, are represented with dichoto-
mous measures coded by the authors.
We may also see broader kinds of social disaffec-
tion. It could be those who perceive themselves as so-
cial “have-nots” see referendums as way in which their
voice may be heard. The ESS included two items that tap
such sentiments. One asked respondents if they felt their
“place in society” was at the bottom (versus the top),
and another asked people if they felt they were part of
a group “discriminated against in this country.”1 We ex-
pect people who see themselves in these terms may be
more likely to view referendums as important to democ-
racy. Social place is a self-reported 0–10 scale where 0
is “bottom” and 10 is “top of society.” Perceptions of dis-
crimination is a dichotomous measure.
As noted, the ESS contained questions about refer-
endums that measured two different concepts: attitudes
about referendums as a principle of democracy, and at-
titudes about how much the respondent perceived that
people in the respondent’s country had a say via referen-
dums in practice. Given the second item asks about per-
ceptions, we expect a somewhat different pattern of re-
sults with the item asking about referendum use in prac-
tice than with the item asking about expecting referen-
dums as a democratic principle. Specifically, we expect
that people who might be more sanguine about status
quo politics to be less likely to perceive that people in
their country do not have a say in general, and thus less
likely to agree that people do not have a say via referen-
dums. As such, people who supported the main parties
in government, those who trusted politicians, and those
who viewed themselves in the upper echelon of society,
could be more likely to respond positively when asked if
people have a “final say” by referendums.
We expand these hypotheses to considering the gap
between attitudes about referendums as a principle of
democracy, and perceptions or referendum use (or, ref-
erendum disappointment). Country-level factors that we
expect to correspond with disaffection (e.g., corruption,
inequality) are expected to predict greater disappoint-
ment. We expect more disappointment among people
1 This included discrimination based on race, nationality, religion, language, ethnicity, ethnic group, age, sexual orientation, disability, and (the modal
category) “other grounds.”
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who live in a country where referendums are used in-
frequently. We also expect greater referendum disap-
pointment among those who we hypothesized would be
more likely to view referendums as an important demo-
cratic principle. As noted in the previous section, a po-
tential effect of referendum use may be contingent on
how interested a person is in politics. If interest is as-
sociated with placing more importance on referendums
as part of democracy, we may find less referendum dis-
appointment among those with high interest in coun-
tries where referendums are used more. We examine
this with postestimation analysis in Stata.
Finally, we include age, gender, and frequency of at-
tending religious services as individual-level control vari-
ables. We also control for ideology, a 0–10 scale where
high scores are self-reported “right” ideology. The Ap-
pendix provides details on the variables and codings.
3.3. Measuring Attitudes about Referendums in
Principle and in Practice
The ESS 6 (2012) covered 29 countries, but we omit
four cases (Albania, Kosovo, Russia, and Ukraine) that
were arguably less than fully democratic. The ESS 6 in-
cluded two items asking about referendum democracy;
one asked respondents to consider how important refer-
endums were for “democracy in general,” and a second
asked about how the respondent perceived people in the
respondent’s country had a say through referendums.
This provides us three dependent variables. The first
measures a respondent’s viewof how important it was to
democracy in general that citizens have the “final say” on
important matters of policy “by voting on them directly
in referendums.” This is our first dependent variable—
the perceived importance of referendums as a general
principle of democracy. This item ranges from 0 to 10
with the highest scores reflecting the attitude that ref-
erendums are extremely important for democracy (the
mean is 8.2).
The second ESS question asked respondent’s their
perception of whether or not people had the “final say”
on important issues in their country “by voting on them
directly in referendums.” This is our second dependent
variable, also ranging from 0–10, with higher scores re-
flecting a person thought citizens in their country had the
final say in practice via referendums. The mean for per-
ceptions of referendumuse in practice is 5.0,much lower
than themean for attitudes about referendums being an
important principle of democracy. These two items are
only modestly correlated (0.14).
We use these two items to construct a third depen-
dent variable that represents a respondent’s disappoint-
ment with referendum democracy, as related their ex-
pectations and perceptions about the use of referen-
dums. It is created by subtracting a person’s score on the
first item (perceptions of referendums as a principle of
democracy) from their score on the second item (percep-
tions of referendums in practice). A respondent scoring
high on this referendum disappointment measure would
be someone who thought it was important for people
to have a say via referendums, but viewed their country
as a place where this was unlikely. This measure ranges
from −10 to 10 (or 0 to 10, depending on specification,
see Appendix). This third dependent variable is the gap
between what a person views as a general principle of
democracy and what they see as its practice, more than
simply a measure of support for using referendums. We
employedmulti-level models to estimate these attitudes
about referendums and democracy. Baseline random in-
tercepts models were also estimated to calculate the
proportion of variance explained by country-level versus
individual-level factors (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002).
4. Results
Table 1 reports results of a model estimating attitudes
about referendums being an important democratic prin-
ciple, and amodel estimating perceptions of referendum
use in practice. Table 2 reports models estimating ref-
erendum disappointed (the gap between expectations
about referendums as a democratic principle, and per-
ceptions of how referendums are used).
We canmake a number of points based on the results.
First, the major source of variation in attitudes about ref-
erendums as a democratic principle is at the individual
rather than the country level. In some ways this is not
much of a surprise given what we have seen in Figure 1:
there is little variation in opinions cross-nationally when
it comes to judging the importance of referendums. The
Intra-class correlation (ICC) calculated for a baseline ver-
sion ofModel 1 in Table 1 estimates that just 4.5% of vari-
ance in attitudes about referendumsbeing a general prin-
ciple of democracy is explained by variance across coun-
tries. In contrast, a baseline version of Model 2 in Table 1
illustrates that a modest amount of variation in percep-
tions of referendum use in practice (15.6%) is explained
by country-level differences.
Second, at the individual-level we find the politically
and socially disaffected—those who voted for right pop-
ulist parties, who had low trust in politicians, and who
perceived they were discriminated against—were more
likely to agree that having a say via referendums was im-
portant as a democratic principle, and were more likely
to see citizens not having a say via referendums in prac-
tice. Those who viewed themselves at the bottom of
society were also more likely to say referendums were
not used enough in practice. Supporters of governing
parties, conversely, were less likely to see referendums
as important.
Third, we find some mixed support for the expecta-
tion that engaged citizens view referendums as impor-
tant to democracy. Citizens who were more engaged in
terms of political participation were more likely to view
referendums as important in principle, and lacking in
practice. Furthermore, peoplemore interested in politics
were alsomore likely to see referendums as important to
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Table 1. Attitudes about referendums as a principle of democracy, and perceptions of referendum use in practice.
Model 1 Model 2
Refs as dem. principle Ref use in practice
Country-level factors
Corruption .0057 −.0266*
(.0047) (.0136)
Unemployment .0348** .0205
(.0141) (.0474)
Gini Index (inequality) −0.7945 −7.492*
(1.823) (3.217)
Number of referendums .0016** .0041**
(.0002) (.0006)
Party system disproportionality −.0042 .1384
(.0151) (.0320)
Individual-level factors
Support right-populist party .5592** −.3022**
(.0651) (.0998)
Support government party −.0933* .1473
(.0420) (.0972)
Distrust politicians .0634** −.2408**
(.0115) (.0252)
Perceive as discriminated against .1974** −.5201**
(.0531) (.1286)
R’s place in society (top) .0152 .1091**
(.0101) (.0201)
Participation .0508** −.1718**
(.0156) (.0226)
Education −.0369* −.1484**
(.0185) (.0210)
Interest .0730** −.0688*
(.0203) (.0337)
Left/right self-placement −.0071 .0397*
(.0093) (.0192)
Age .0004 .0020
(.0007) (.0017)
Female .1536** .0107
(.0337) .0386)
Freq. attend religious services .0190 −.0873**
[high = never] (.0125) (.0163)
Constant 7.846** 7.484**
(.5075) (1.032)
Random effects (variance)
Constant .130 .651
(.032) (.199)
Residual 3.97 7.66
(.184) (.240)
Observations 41,560 41,034
Number of countries 25 25
Baseline ICC .045 .156
Level-1 R2 .026 .146
Level-2 R2 .320 .581
Notes: ** = significant at p. < .01; * = at p. < .05. (two-tail). DV in Model 1 is response to question asking how important it is for
democracy that citizens have final say via referendums (0–10, with 10 = extremely important). DV in Model 2 is response to question
asking how much citizens in r’s country have the final say via referendums (0–10, with 10 = agree completely). Estimated with weights.
Standard errors in parentheses. R2 are Snijders & Bosker (1994).
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Table 2. Disappointment with democracy, as related to referendum use.
Model 1 Model 2
Disappointment Disappointment
Country level factors
Corruption .0319* .0322**
(.0135) (.0117)
Unemployment .0158 .0144
(.0424) (.0394)
Gini Index (inequality) 6.563** 5.813**
(2.837) (2.375)
Party system disproportionality −.0183 −.0202
(.0276) (.0246)
Number of referendums −.0025** −.0022**
(.0005) (.0004)
Individual level factors
Support Populist Party .8621** .7727**
(.1205) (.1269)
Support Government Party −.2433* −.2102*
(.1023) (.0977)
Left/right self-placement −.0487* −.0431*
(.0225) (.0220)
Distrust politicians .3042** .2910**
(.0294) (.0281)
Perceive discrimination .7121** .6813**
(.1304) (.1278)
R’s place in society (top) −.0920** −.0892**
(.0233) (.0226)
Participation .2225** .2127**
(.0271) (.0257)
Interest .1482** .1393**
(.0233) (.0226)
Education .1099** .1029**
(.0171) (.0150)
Age −.0023 −.0015
(.0018) (.0008)
Female .1440** .0973**
(.0498) (.0420)
Freq. attend Religious services .1068** .0985**
[high = never] (.0226) (.0211)
Constant 0.374 0.817
(0.885) (0.803)
Random effects (variance)
Constant .495 .396
(.202) (.161)
Residual 9.80 8.14
(.447) (.460)
Observations 40,505 40,505
Number of countries 25 25
Baseline ICC .126 .137
Level-1 R2 .149 .160
Level-2 R2 .677 .704
Notes: **= significant at p.< .01; *= at p.< .05. (two-tail). High scores on DVs represent larger gap between r’s report of how important
it is for democracy that citizens have final say via referendums, and r’s report of how much citizens in r’s country have the final say via
referendums. DV in Model 1 includes negative values (−10 to 10, with 10 =most disappointed). DV in Model 2 sets negative values at 0.
Estimated with weights. Standard errors in parentheses. R2 are Snijders & Boske (1994). Source: ESS Round 6 (2012).
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democracy, and to potentially find them lacking in prac-
tice. However, support for referendums in principle was
greater among those with lower levels of education, and
those with more education were less likely to think peo-
ple were having a say via referendum use in practice.
As noted above, 15.6% of variance in perceptions of
how often referendums are used in practice is due to
country-level differences, and our country-level variables
explain 58% of this variance. Our measures of corruption
and inequality are both associated with the perception
that citizens were not having “a final say” via referen-
dums. We find unemployment associated with expecta-
tions for referendum use in principle, but not in practice.
Further, the number of referendums used in a country
had a positive effect on whether citizens viewed referen-
dums as an important part of democracy, and also had a
positive effect on perceptions that people actually had a
say via referendums. The proportionality of the party sys-
tem was not associated with support for referendums as
a democratic principle or views of its use in practice.
Table 2 reports estimates of our measure of disap-
pointment with referendum democracy, in terms of the
gap between perceptions of referendums being impor-
tant for democracy, and perceptions of how much they
are used in the respondent’s country. Higher values on
this dependent variable reflect greater disappointment
over not having a say via referendums, relative to the im-
portance a respondent places on referendums.Model 3A
includes negative values on our disappointmentmeasure,
while Model 3B has all negative values set at zero. The
mean value for thismeasure across the sample on the for-
mer measure is 3.3, and 3.1 on the latter, implying some
disappointment is present. Moreover, 25% of the sam-
ple had a 5-point difference or greater between their at-
titudes about the importance of referendums as a demo-
cratic principle and their perceptions of referendum use
in practice on the measure bounded at 0–10. A 5-point
difference suggests a sizable amount of disappointment.
Table 2 documents that those we assume to be disaf-
fectedweremore disappointed in democracy as it relates
to the use of referendums. Right-populist voters, those
who did not support a governing party, those who did
not trust politicians, thosewho felt discriminated against,
and hose who rated themselves at the “bottom” of soci-
ety were each more disappointed—in that they viewed
referendum use as important while also being less likely
to perceive having a say via referendums practice. Tests
using the disappointment measure also produce some
results that may be seen as consistent with the engaged
citizen thesis; those who scoring higher on our participa-
tionmeasure, the higher educated, and thosemore inter-
ested in politics, respectively, scored higher on this form
of referendum disappointment. These respondents may
have expected more from referendums relative to what
they perceived as occurring in practice. Women, those
on the political left, and those who with lower (or no) at-
tendance at religious services (included in the models as
controls) were also more disappointed.
The ICC for models in Table 2 demonstrates a mod-
est amount of variation in referendum disappointment
(12.6% forModel 3A, 13.7% forModel 3B) is explained by
country-level factors. Inequality and corruption are key
here. Income inequality corresponded with higher levels
of disappointment, and we find greater disappointment
in countries with higher levels of public corruption.
Figure 2 plots postestimation predictions of referen-
dum disappointment from Model 3B (Table 2) for key
county-level variables. It illustrates that a respondent in
a country with the highest values on corruption (Bulgaria
and Italy) would score 1.5 points higher on the disap-
pointment measure than a demographically identical re-
spondent in the least corrupt countries (Finland and
Denmark). Inequality has a similar, but slightly smaller
effect. A person in a country with high income inequal-
ity (e.g., Portugal) would score a full point higher than
someone in the least unequal country (Sweden). Figure 2
also illustrates all else equal, a respondent in a coun-
try with the highest use of national level referendums
(Switzerland) would score 1.1 points less disappointed
than a person in a country that never had heldmore than
one national referendum (e.g., Belgium, Finland, Israel).
Figure 3 and Figure 4 display the estimated substan-
tive effects of our key individual-level variables, with
Figure 3 plotting estimates for variables associated with
the disaffection hypotheses, and Figure 4 plotting ef-
fects for variables associated with the engaged citizen
hypotheses. These figures suggest the substantive mag-
nitude of the relationship between some variables rep-
resenting disaffection, and referendum disappointment
(Figure 3), is more substantial than the relationships be-
tween most of the engagement variables (Figure 4) and
referendum disappointment. This is particularly evident
with trust. All else equal, a respondent with no trust in
politicians (nearly one-fifth of respondents) is estimated
to score nearly 3 points higher on referendumdisappoint-
ment than a respondent who completely trusted politi-
cians. Supporters of right-populist parties (“rwp voter”
in the figure) score nearly a point higher on disappoint-
ment than supporters of a party in government. Consid-
ering that these are additive models, the additive effects
of disaffection—right-wing populism, distrust, and rating
one’s self at the bottom of society—are substantial.
Some results here are consistent with the idea that
this referendum disappointment could reflect engaged
citizens who desire greater opportunities to participate
in policymaking. However, the only noteworthy substan-
tive effect in Figure 4 is for our six-item index of participa-
tion. Table 2 demonstrates that the ranks of those scor-
ing significantly higher on referendum disappointment
include those with more education, more political inter-
est, and those who participate more. On this latter mea-
sure, a respondent scoring 6 (highest) is estimated to be
nearly 1.5 points higher on disappointment than some-
one scoring at 0, however only 20% of respondents score
higher than 1 on this measure. The estimated effect of
political interest illustrated in Figure 4, moreover, is less
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Figure 2. Referendum disappointment: Post-estimation predicted magnitude of country-level variables. Notes: From
Model 3B. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Range is 0–10.
Figure 3. Referendum disappointment: Post-estimation predicted magnitude of individual-level disaffection variables.
Notes: From Model 3B. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Range is 0–10.
than half a point. We did consider that effects of en-
gagement may be contingent on how often referendums
were used. Table 1 illustrates that those with more polit-
ical interest placed value on having referendums as part
of democracy, while also perceiving that peoplewere not
having a say via referendums. In a model not reported
here, and in postestimation analysis of Model 3B, we
found a significant interaction between political interest
and referendum use, where those with more political in-
terest had less referendum disappointment if they lived
where more referendums were used. However, a highly
interested person only had significantly less referendum
disappointment than a person with low interest when
referendum use was set at a level equal to Switzerland.
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Figure 4. Referendum disappointment: Post-estimation predicted magnitude of individual-level engagement variables.
Notes: From Model 3B. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Range is 0–10.
5. Conclusion
Much research on attitudes about referendum use has
been grounded in single country studies which do not
account for context. Many previous studies have exam-
ined general attitudes about the use of referendums (on
a specific policy matter) rather than examining attitudes
about referendums in terms of expectations people have
about democracy.
We found broad support for the idea that referen-
dums are important to democracy. Limited variation in
this expectation was best explained by how people were
oriented to the political system. Those peopleweassume
as politically disaffected—people who supported pop-
ulist parties, thosewho did not support a party in govern-
ment, those who distrusted politicians, and those who
felt themselves on the bottom of society—were most
likely to say that referendums were important to their
conception of democracy. By contrast, those who sup-
ported a party in government, and people more trusting
of politicians, felt less strongly that democracy requires
voters have the final say via referendums. Although we
find some evidence thatmarkers of political engagement
were associated with viewing referendums as important
to democracy, indicators of political disaffection appear
more consequential.
That noted, our main goal was to examine the gap
between this widely held expectation that democracy
involves voters having a say through referendums, and
their perceptions of how referendum democracy was
giving people a say in practice. We find a substantial
amount of disappointment regarding the use of refer-
endums. It is not only individual-level markers of po-
litical disaffection—right-wing populist voting, distrust
of politicians, and seeing one’s self at the bottom of
society—that most substantially predict this form of ref-
erendum disappointment. Country-level forces such as
income inequality and political corruption also corre-
spondedwith people who viewed referendums as impor-
tant while perceiving that people were not being given
a say through referendums. These results suggest that
experiences with inequality and corruption may be fac-
tors that lead some people to look beyond established
parties and representative democracy for referendums
as alternative modes of political influence. Particularly in
countries where things were not going as well, respon-
dents were more likely to report a gap between their ex-
pectation that democracy should provide a say through
referendums, and their perceptions of having opportuni-
ties to actually have that say. For many people who are
disaffected, democracy in practice was not living up to
this widely held democratic principle of allowing people
to have a direct say via referendums.
This gap between the widely held democratic ex-
pectations of referendums, and variable perceptions of
not having a say via referendums in practice, may pro-
vide space that allows political entrepreneurs to exploit
frustrations disaffected people have with representative
democracy. Political consequences of this may be seen
in growing support for populist parties, in demands for
the Brexit referendum, for a second Brexit vote, and in
calls for additional referendums that have occurred since.
All of this suggests that “outsider” movements may tap
into disaffection, and potentially gain additional support,
with calls for increased use of referendums—calls that
may not simply be calculated to set policy, but to manu-
facture a sense that people will finally have their say.
That said, we must end with some caveats. Referen-
dums are frequently “top down,” in that they are placed
on the ballot by incumbent politicians. Although we find
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corruption and income inequality associated with per-
ceptions that people are not having a say though refer-
endums, and with our referendum disappointment mea-
sure, these factors could depress trust in democratic in-
stitutions generally, including trust in top down referen-
dums. Additionally, we cannot tell from these data which
types of referendums it is that people value, nor which
types of referendums they perceive as providing a mean-
ingful say.
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Appendix
Note on robustness
As demonstrated in Table 2, our results are not contingent on how negative values of the disappointment measure are
coded. Model 1 in Table 2 estimates disappointment where values range from -10 to 10. As a robustness check, Model 2
estimates the same model with all negative values set at 0. We consider negative values as reflecting a lack of disap-
pointment. Any value at 0 or lower may also reflect a lack of disappointment and/or indifference. Model 2 in Table 2
demonstrates that the results are not affected by how negative values are coded.
Moreover, in results not reported here we re-estimated models reported in Table 1 and Table 2 with cases limited to
European Union nations, with a different measure of income inequality (from the European Union), and with a different
measure of government performance (aWorld Bank governancemeasure, rather than the TI corruption rating). Regardless
of the permutation of cases and measures, our substantive results were unchanged. Results are also consistent whether
or not Switzerland (an outlier on referendum use) is included or excluded from the analysis.
Our findings are also robust across a range of different model specifications including case selection (e.g., excluding
Switzerland), excluding some individual level measures (e.g., religious attendance—which we include as a control), and
controlling for “former Communist” states.
Individual level variables (ESS variable name in parenthesis where appropriate)
Support populist party. Coded as 1 if respondent reported voting for a party identified as right-wing populist (e.g., Swiss
People’s Party, Danish People’s Party, Vlaams Belang, True Finns, Front National, Lega Nord, PVV [List Wilders], Progress
Party [Norway], Swedish Democrats [Sverigedemokraterna]).
Support government party. Coded as 1 if respondent reported voting in the last election for a party that was in govern-
ment, 0 if otherwise.
Left/right scale (lrscale). Respondent self-placement on left–right scale. 0–10 scale, 0–left, 10 = right. “Don’t know” re-
sponses coded as 5.
Trust in politicians (trstplt). Trust in politicians 0–10 scale, 0 = no trust at all, 10 = complete trust. Reverse coded so high
values = distrust.
Participation. 1 point each if respondent worked for “a party or action group” (wrkprty), “another organization” (wrkorg),
displayed a badge or sticker (badge), signed a petition (sgnptit), boycotted product (bctprd), or took part in a lawful protest
(pbldmn) in the last 12 months. 0–6 scale. 0 = no participation, 6 = all forms of participation.
R’s place in society (plinsoc). Respondent’s self-placement when asked “Your place in society?” 1–10 scale; 0 = “bottom
of our society”…10 = “top of our society.”
Age (agea). Age of respondent in years.
Education (eisced). Highest level of education, ES–ISCED. 1–7 scale; 1 = less than lower secondary…7 = higher tertiary
education.
Interest (polintr). Interest in politics, recoded 1 = low, 4 = high.
Female (gndr). 1 = female, 0 =male.
Experienced discrimination (dscrgrp). Respondent self-reported perception of being “member of a group discriminated
against in this country.” 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Attend religious services (rlgatnd). How often attend religious services apart from special occasions? 1–7 scale, 1 = every
day…7 = never.
Country level variables
Number of referendums. Calculated from reports in Qvortrup (2014)
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 227–241 240
Party System Disproportionality. Gallagher index for recent election result. Ranges from .73 (Denmark) to 17.6 (France).
Unemployment. 2012 levels, fromWorld Bank. Ranges from 3.2 (Norway) to 25.2 (Spain).
Gini index (inequality). From CIA database. Ranges from .23 (Sweden) to .45 (Bulgaria).
Corruption. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Scale ranging from 41 (Bulgaria), 44 (Italy) to 90 (Fin-
land, Denmark). Transposed so higher scores reflect greater corruption.
Dependent variables (original question wording)
Referendums in principle (votedir). “Thinking generally rather than about [country], how important do you think it is for
democracy in general that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on they directly in
referendums” 0 (not at all important for democracy in general) through 10 (extremely important for democracy in general).
Referendums in practice (votedirc). “To what extend you think…the following statement applies in [country]. Citizens in
[country] have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.” 0 (does not
apply at all) through 10 (applies completely).
Disappointment with referendums. Calculated as votedir–votedirc. −10 through 10, high scores reflect greater gap be-
tween greater regard for referendums as a democratic principle and perceptions of referendum use in practice.
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